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Abstract
Abstract: Default effects are pervasive, but the reason they arise is often unclear. We study
optimal policy when the planner does not know whether an observed default effect reflects a
welfare-relevant preference or a mistake. Within a broad class of models, we find that determining
optimal policy is impossible without resolving this ambiguity. Depending on the resolution,
optimal policy tends in opposite directions: either minimizing the number of non-default choices
or inducing active choice. We show how these considerations depend on whether active choosers
make mistakes when selecting among non-default options. We illustrate our results using data
on pension contribution defaults.
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A fundamental challenge in behavioral economics is determining whether some observed behavior reflects
a mistake by decision-makers. If the behavior violates the predictions of a neoclassical model of decision-
making, one can typically modify the preferences of the agents in the model to rationalize the observed
decisions. Doing so can realign the model’s predictions with the data, but introduces normative ambigu-
ity; that is, do the modified preferences actually reflect the decision-maker’s welfare or do they instead
reflect a divergence between welfare and choice? Conducting welfare analysis in behavioral settings requires
confronting this issue.
We study this problem for the case of default effects.1 We consider two types of mistakes that potentially
cause welfare and choice to diverge. First, decision-makers may misperceive which option maximizes their
welfare; for example, there is a heated debate over whether individuals save too little for retirement (Ghi-
larducci, 2019). Second, decision-makers may act as if there is some cost to choosing an option other than
the default even when this apparent cost, if incurred, would not actually affect decision-makers’ welfare. In
theory, these sources of normative ambiguity might be resolved by identifying the precise structural model
that generates behavior. In practice, distinguishing between alternative behavioral models is difficult in most
settings in which default effects are observed. Prior research that studies optimal policy with default effects
has addressed the issue either by assuming a specific behavioral model (Carroll et al., 2009) or by considering
robustness to several alternative models (Bernheim, Fradkin and Popov, 2015). Neither of these approaches
shed light on which features of the behavioral model drive the optimal policy results, making it difficult to
extrapolate the results to settings in which other behavioral models may be at play, or settings in which
additional policy tools are available.
The starting point for our approach is that for a broad class of decision-making models, the effect of
defaults on behavior can be characterized in terms of two ingredients: (1) decision-makers’ utility over the
menu of available options, and (2) an “as-if” cost to selecting an option that is not the default (i.e., to making
an active choice). This implied cost to opting out of the default is defined so as to rationalize decision-makers’
observed behavior; decision-makers behave as if opting out of the default causes them to incur a cost of this
magnitude. Unlike standard revealed preference models, we do not impose that as-if costs actually reduce
welfare for those who choose to incur them. Instead, we parameterize the degree to which as-if costs are
normative (that is, the degree to which they enter into decision-makers’ welfare). Thus, the first type of
normative ambiguity we study corresponds to uncertainty in the degree to which as-if costs are normative.
Alternative behavioral models imply different conclusions about the degree to which as-if costs are nor-
mative. For example, one explanation for default effects is that decision-makers rationally seek to avoid
1A large empirical literature documents the effect of defaults on behavior. Prominent examples include Madrian and Shea
(2001); Johnson and Goldstein (2003); Haggag and Paci (2014); Handel (2013); Beshears et al. (2017).
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exerting the mental effort required to choose between non-default options. In this model, all as-if costs
are normative. Alternatively, decision-makers might seek to avoid exerting mental effort, but systematically
over-estimate the amount of effort required to choose between non-default options. In this model, some – but
not all – as-if costs are normative. A third possibility is that decision-makers inadvertently fail to consider
making an active decision in the first place, in which case none of the observed as-if costs are normative.
Although rejecting certain behavioral models might be possible with the right data, it is difficult to conceive
of a convincing empirical test for determining the share of as-if costs that enter into decision-makers’ welfare.
This dilemma is worsened by the fact that there may be heterogeneity among decision-makers in the model
that generates their behavior, and hence, in the degree to which their as-if costs are normative. Because
resolving these issues empirically is challenging, normative ambiguity tends to arise whenever default effects
are observed.
We use our framework to characterize the optimal default in terms of three components: the distribution
of (1) decision-makers’ preferences over the available options; (2) as-if costs; and (3) the share of as-if costs
that are normative. When these components are known, the optimal default can be determined without
additional knowledge of the underlying behavioral model (at least within the class of models we study).
Standard revealed preferences techniques can be used to recover the first two components, but not the third.
Hence, our proposed approach is to identify (1) and (2) from observed choice data and then to characterize
the optimal default as a function of (3), based on the plausible range of behavioral models in the setting at
hand.
We show that when as-if costs are mostly non-normative, the optimal policy induces decision-makers
to make an active choice. Depending on the setting, the planner can implement this policy directly, by
eliminating the presence of any default option from the decision, or indirectly, by setting as the default
an option that decision-makers find sufficiently undesirable. In contrast, when as-if costs are sufficiently
normative, forcing active choice is not only undesirable, doing so actually minimizes social welfare. Instead,
we show that a better approach in this case is to set a default that leads relatively few decision-makers to
opt out; doing so results in many people receiving an option that is close to the option they most prefer and
few people incurring the (normative) costs of opting out. Optimal policy in this case resembles a rule of
thumb that has been proposed in the literature: minimizing the number of opt-outs (Thaler and Sunstein,
2003). Our results therefore clarify the conditions under which this rule of thumb yields desirable policies.
The second source of normative ambiguity we consider is whether decision-makers choose optimally when
selecting a non-default option. When active choices are sub-optimal, opting out of a default can reduce the
quality of the option that one selects. In such cases, the optimal default depends on decision-makers’ true
(unbiased) preferences but also accounts for the possibility that decision-makers opt-out when the default
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is set too far from the outcome they (incorrectly) perceive to be their ideal. Such mistakes reduce the
desirability of policies that promote active choice.
We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employee contribution decisions to a 401(k) retire-
ment plan. We characterize the optimal default as a function of the degree to which employees over-weight
opt-out costs and misperceive their privately optimal saving rate. For the firm we study, we illustrate quan-
titatively our theoretical claim that one cannot identify the optimal policy without taking a stance on these
issues. When employees’ active savings decisions are optimal, the critical threshold in our data is whether the
normative share of as-if costs is less than 8 percent of total as-if costs – about $160 for the median employee.
When the normative component of as-if costs is below this threshold, the optimal policy induces employees
to make an active contribution decision. In contrast, when the normative component of as-if costs exceeds
this threshold, the optimal default is the contribution rate that minimizes employee opt-outs, which, for
this firm, corresponds to the rate that maximizes the employer match. In addition, if employees under-save
for reasons unrelated to the default, the optimal policy tilts away from active choice and toward setting
the default to a relatively high contribution rate. Finally, the two types of mistakes we consider interact in
important ways: the further opt-out decisions are from optimal, the more the optimal policy depends on the
degree of under-saving by active employees.
Our results contribute to a growing literature on the welfare economics of default options. A closely-
related paper to ours is Bernheim, Fradkin and Popov (2015) (“BFP”), which studies the optimal contribution
rate default for an employer-provided 401(k) retirement plan. BFP consider a range of potential behavioral
models for default effects and estimate the optimal policy within each model using employee contribution
data. They find that the optimal default is quite stable across models for the firms in their data, suggesting
that normative ambiguity does not pose a major challenge to identifying the optimal default.
Our results build on BFP in several important respects. First, we use our model to clarify the settings
in which policymakers should promote active choices. In such cases, we show that determining the optimal
policy is impossible without resolving normative ambiguity to some degree. This result has practical impor-
tance: in our empirical 401(k) application, for example, we find that the optimal policy plausibly promotes
active choice rather than minimizing employee opt-outs (as BFP concluded). A related advantage of our
approach is that it allows one to quantify in dollars the threshold of normative opt-outs costs for which
promoting opt-outs becomes optimal.2
The second way in which we build on BFP is by generalizing the level of abstraction to highlight which
2BFP do consider one policy that has the effect of inducing active choice, which is to tax the default option. However, they
do not consider how the desirability of this policy varies based on the underlying model. Instead, they point out that a tax on
the default can yield large welfare losses if some decision-makers exogenously remain passive. That concern applies to some,
but not all, forms of encouraging active choice; e.g., it would not apply to policies that simply remove the default, as in Carroll
et al. (2009).
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features of a behavioral model matter for shaping optimal policy.3 We model default effects at a high level
of generality so that our results are consistent with a broad class of positive models that might generate
default effects, including the specific models that BFP consider.4 This approach yields three payoffs: First,
the lessons we draw for optimal policy emerge from general features of the problem rather than the specific
models one happens to consider. For example, we show the generic reason why BFP find some robustness in
the optimal default: normative ambiguity tends not to affect the optimal default when active choice policies
are ruled out and preferences over contribution rates are sufficiently well-behaved. Second, because our
framework is not tied to a specific positive model, it can easily incorporate heterogeneity in the model that
explains an observed default effect or even uncertainty over the correct positive model. Third, the generality
of our approach dramatically simplifies some key features of the problem, making our framework transparent
and easy to apply. In fact, our approach has already been fruitfully applied to study optimal 401(k) defaults
within a dynamic setting (Choukhmane, 2019).
Our third contribution is to consider settings in which decision-makers make mistakes for reasons unre-
lated to default effects. Such mistakes are frequently invoked to argue for using defaults to shape behavior,
such as automatic enrollment into 401(k) plans to combat under-saving by employees (e.g., Thaler and Sun-
stein, 2008; Camerer et al., 2003). To our knowledge, however, the prior theoretical work on optimal defaults
excludes “internalities” of this form. This omission is surprising, given that some of the proposed mechanisms
by which default effects operate – such as present-bias – might also imply biased decision-making by those
selecting non-default options, depending on the decision being observed.
Two other papers are also closely related to our own. Carroll et al. (2009) was the first to study when
policies that force active choice are preferable to setting a default. Within a model in which present bias
magnifies the cost of opting out of the default, they show that the desirability of active choice depends on
the degree of time inconsistency that decision-makers exhibit.5 We extend this result to settings in which
decision-makers are sensitive to the default for reasons unrelated to present bias and to models in which
active choosers make mistakes. More recently, Chesterley (2017) also studies the welfare effect of default
options but focuses on a different set of policies than the ones we consider, such as policies that vary the
cost of selecting a non-default option. In contrast, Chesterley’s setup is not designed for studying normative
ambiguity: he assumes the social planner knows the degree to which observed as-if costs are normative, and
the only behavioral model he considers is one in which default effects are magnified because of present bias.
3BFP’s approach to welfare analysis is first, to select a positive model, and second, to identify the optimal policy within
that model (holding fixed the positive model itself). Within positive models, they do vary the welfare criteria, generating some
normative ambiguity within but not between models.
4As described in Section 1, the as-if cost representation we study captures all but the anchoring model considered by BFP.
We show in the Online Appendix that our key results extend to that model as well.
5The focus of Carroll et al. (2009) is an empirical comparison of active choice to opt-in 401(k) plan design; they do not apply
their theoretical results to data.
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Another related strand of the literature attempts to disentangle mechanisms by which default effects
operate. A few recent papers examine the implications of inattention for estimates of switching costs, often
in the context of choosing a health insurance plan (Abaluck and Adams, 2017; Heiss et al., 2016). Using
different strategies, both of these papers estimate that as-if switching costs are in the thousands of dollars,
which is consistent with the estimates from pension plans we discuss below, but that once inattention is
accounted for, the estimated as-if switching costs are only in the hundreds of dollars. Blumenstock, Callen
and Ghani (2017) conducts an experiment to study the mechanisms underlying default effects in a savings
context; they find the cognitive costs of selecting a savings plan play an important role. These results can
inform the normative judgments policy-makers must make but they do not resolve normative ambiguity.
For instance, if one accepts that as-if costs are primarily driven by a reluctance to pay attention to non-
default options, the planner must still determine the degree to which incurring such costs would reduce
actually welfare.6 Understanding the role of normative judgments in behavioral welfare analysis is therefore
complementary to understanding the mechanisms by which default effects operate.
For clarity of exposition, we focus first on the question of whether as-if costs are normative, and then
incorporate the possibility that active decision-makers might choose suboptimally. The remainder of the
paper is therefore organized as follows: Section 1 sets out the model with normative ambiguity over as-if
costs. Section 2 examines optimal policy-making in this model, with a particular focus on policies promoting
active choice and defaults that minimize the number of opt-outs. Section 3 incorporates the possibility that
active decision-makers make mistakes. Section 4 illustrates our results using data on 401(k) plan contribution
defaults. Section 5 concludes.
1 Model
Consider a population of measure 1. Decision-makers choose from a fixed menu X, where xi ∈ X denotes the
option chosen by individual i. One option, d ∈ X, is presented to decision-makers as the default. Decision-
makers have well-behaved preferences over the elements of X, represented by utility function ui(·).7 We
assume that ui(·) is cardinal and comparable across individuals. Preferences over X do not depend on the
default.
6For helpful discussions of issues relating to attention, information frictions, and policymaking, see Handel (2013) and Handel
and Schwartzstein (2018).
7Note that the differentiability of ui(x) may fail in some relevant applications. For example, with 401(k) plans with an
employer match, u(x) might exhibit an interior kink point at the contribution rate at which the match kicks in or at which the
match is maximized. We discuss this further below.
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Individual behavior is characterized by the following optimization problem:
xi(d) = argmax
x∈X
ui(x)− γi 1{x 6=d} (1)
where γi ≥ 0 for all i.8 We will refer to γi as the as-if cost to selecting an option that is not the default.
Let x∗i = arg max
x∈X
ui(x) denote the choice that maximizes (1) when γi = 0. We assume that decision-makers
indifferent between selecting the default and opting out will select the default. Under these assumptions,





i )− ui(d) > γi
d ui(x
∗
i )− ui(d) ≤ γi
(2)
We next define ai(d) = ui(x∗i )−ui(d)−γi, which reflects the degree to which an individual prefers opting
out. We will refer to a decision-maker with ai(d) > 0 as active at default d and a decision-maker with
ai(d) ≤ 0 as passive at default d.9 We denote the cumulative distribution of ai(d) over the population of
decision-makers at a given default by Fa;d.
Our main results will apply to the class of models generating behavior that can be represented by (2).
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) derives necessary and sufficient restrictions on behavior that a model with this
representation must satisfy.10 For example, (2) requires that if a decision-maker would choose x over y when
y is the default, she must also choose x over y when x is the default.
Equation (2) described individual behavior. The following equation characterizes individual welfare:
wi(x, d) = ui(x)− pii γi 1{x6=d} (3)
where pii ∈ [0, 1] reflects the degree to which the as-if costs are normative and thus affect the decision-
maker’s welfare.11 One can think of the maximand in (1) as “decision utility” and the utility function in (3)
as “experienced utility” (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997). When pii = 1, a decision-maker’s sensitivity
to the default is rational. When pii = 0, default sensitivity represents a complete mistake; the decision-maker
behaves as if selecting a non-default option would reduce his welfare, but if he were to actually select a non-
8For simplicity, we focus on the case in which γi is fixed for each individual. We show in the Online Appendix that the
intuition of our main results extends to the case in which γi depends on which option is the default.
9Note that a decision-maker who “actively” considers each option in the choice set before settling on the option that happens
to be the default would still be referred to as “passive” in our terminology. In addition, below we will assume that such a
decision-maker’s welfare is the same as a decision-maker who selects the default without considering other alternatives. This
assumption is innocuous for purposes of deriving the optimal default under our model, since a decision-maker who considers
each option even when her most-preferred option is the default would also consider each option under alternative defaults.
10This representation is slightly less general than the one implied by the Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) axioms. Our main results
extend to the more general representation as well (see the Online Appendix).
11One might extend our approach to settings in which pii > 1, which may occur, for example, when opt-out costs are not fully
salient or when individuals overestimate the gains from optimizing. This possibility tends to push the optimal default toward
options that induce relatively few opt-outs.
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default option, his welfare would not decrease. When pii ∈ (0, 1), it would be rational for the decision-maker
to exhibit some sensitivity to the default, but his behavior implies that the welfare reduction from opting
out is greater than it actually is.12 Note that (3) embeds the assumption that active choosers make optimal
decisions over the (non-default) options they select, as active choosers maximize the sub-utility function
ui(x). We relax this assumption in Section 3.
We denote a decision-maker’s indirect utility by vi(d) ≡ wi(xi(d), d). Aggregate social welfare under
default d is given by W (d) ≡ ´
i
vi(d) di. An optimal default d∗ ∈ X is an option that yields the highest social
welfare when presented as the default, W (d∗) ≥W (d) ∀d ∈ X.
1.1 Relationship to Positive Models of Default Effects
In this section we briefly review alternative behavioral models that have been proposed to explain default
effects and discuss the extent to which they do or do not map into our framework. The main insight is that
although many behavioral models are consistent with our representation, each implies a different conclusion
regarding the share of the as-if costs that are normative (pi). Combinations of these models would generate
an even wider range of possibilities for pi.
Real Opt-Out Costs. Decision-makers select from among the available options according to their pref-
erences over the available items (ui), while rationally accounting for the welfare-relevant costs associated with
selecting an option that is not the default. These costs might include monetary costs, such as administrative
fees for selecting a non-default option, or non-monetary costs such as the hassle or mental effort required
to determine one’s most-preferred option from the available menu. Because decision and experienced utility
are identical in this model, pii = 1.
Status Quo Bias. Another proposed explanation for default effects is that decision-makers follow a
psychological heuristic in which they behave as if it is costly to deviate from the status quo, and simultane-
ously perceive the default option to represent a continuation of the status quo. As suggested by the word
“bias”, this propensity to follow the status quo does not actually increase welfare. Hence, pii = 0.
Endowment Effect. A related possibility is that decision-makers perceive themselves as endowed
with the default option and exhibit reluctance to exchange that endowment for other options (Tversky and
12Close readers of BFP may wonder about the difference between the role of pi in our model and the role of “frame-dependent
weights” in theirs. The idea behind frame-dependent weights is that within certain positive models, the extent to which
a decision-maker accounts for the normative opt-out costs will vary based on the choice environment (i.e., the “frame”). For
example, in a present-bias model, observed choices would reveal larger as-if opt-out costs if the opt-out decision was made during
the same time period in which the opt-out costs were potentially incurred, rather than during a prior period. Thus, frame-
dependent weights account for ambiguity about the proper perspective on welfare within a given positive model. In contrast,
we use pi to reflect different perspectives on welfare either within or across alternative behavioral models. More importantly, in
their empirical application, BFP assume a particular value for their frame-dependent weights (roughly equivalent to pi = 0.01)
that strikes them as ex ante reasonable. In contrast, we remain agnostic about the share of as-if costs that are normative to
highlight how assumptions of this type drive welfare conclusions.
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Kahneman, 1991). Whether this reluctance enters into welfare is controversial (Zeiler, 2017). When the
endowment effect is fully normative, pii = 1; when it is entirely a bias, pii = 0. Intermediate cases would
imply pii ∈ (0, 1).
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting. Suppose a decision-maker decides whether to opt-out of a default in
period one. In all future periods, she receives flow utility from the option she selected in the prior period
and decides again whether to opt out. Assuming that opt-out costs and flow utility functions are fixed over
time, the individual faces the same decision problem and will make the same choice in each period; we can
think of ui(x) as utility for some option x received in perpetuity.13 As in Laibson (1997), δi ∈ (0, 1] denotes
the discount factor and βi ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of present-bias. The contemporaneous cost of opting
out is denoted by ci.
Suppose the decision-maker correctly anticipates her future opt-out decisions. In this case, choices are
described by: xi(d) = arg maxx∈X δiβiui(x) − ci1{x 6=d}. Welfare is described by: w(xi, d) = δi ui(x) −
ci1{x 6=d}. It is straightforward to verify that these preferences are equivalent to (1) and (3), with γi = ciδiβi
and pii = βi.14
Inattention. Decision-makers may intentionally or inadvertently fail to consider the utility of the
available options or the (real or perceived) costs of opting out of the default (Chetty, 2012; Goldin and
Lawson, 2016). Following Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012) we model inattention by supposing that
decision-makers maximize utility over some subset of the available options, Γi(X, d) ⊆ X, where Γi represents
an attention filter: xi(d) = arg maxΓi(X,d) ui(x). Suppose every decision-maker either pays attention only
to the default (passive choice) or to the full menu (active choice) ∀i, Γi(X, d) ∈ {{d}, X}.
There are two intuitive possibilities for how Γi is determined. One is a heuristic model of attention, in
which there are simply two exogenous types of agents: attentive choosers for whom Γi(X, d) = X always
and inattentive choosers for whom Γi(X, d) = d always (Chetty et al., 2014). This model maps into our
framework with γi ∈ {0,∞} and pii = 0. Alternatively, the set of options to which a decision-maker is
attentive may depend on the utility gain from choosing actively. Decision-makers may choose to be attentive
(Γi = X) when the gains to doing so exceed some threshold, and otherwise set Γi = {d}. This model is
equivalent to the general model of default sensitivity laid out above; ambiguity over the welfare consequences
of following the default corresponds to whether the costs of paying attention are themselves normative.
13For analysis of the costly opt-out model in more general dynamic settings, see Carroll et al. (2009) and Choukhmane (2019).
14When decision-makers choose not to opt out today but expect to choose according to their long-run preferences (i.e.,
β = 1) in the future, preferences and behavior can be represented in terms of Equations (2) and (3), with γi = 1−βiκiβi−βiκi
ci
δi
and pii = βi−βiκ1−βiκ , where κ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability the decision-maker assigns to selecting according to her long-run
preferences during the subsequent period. This result follows from incorporating pi into BFP’s analysis of partial naivete. When
κi = 1 (full naivete), the decision-maker will procrastinate indefinitely and never opt out. In this case an observer would
conclude that as-if costs were arbitrarily large and, though such costs would never be incurred, they would be totally irrelevant
for welfare, pii = 0.
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Anchoring Effects. Defaults may shape behavior through psychological anchoring effects, in which
the default induces decision-makers to select an option closer to the default than they would otherwise
choose (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Behavior under such models fall cannot be represented according
to (2) because the default affects choices among those who opt out.15 Although defaults may sometimes
operate through anchoring effects, the empirical evidence reviewed in Section 1.2 suggests that there are
many contexts in which the opt-out cost models appear to better fit the data.16 Online Appendix Section
C extends a number of our key findings using a model that can incorporate framing effects.
Advice. Decision-makers might select the default if they are uncertain over their preferences and they
believe the planner’s choice of default provides an informative signal as to which option is best for them.
The optimal policy prescriptions we consider are geared towards a world in which the planner lacks ex ante
information as to which option is most consistent with decision-makers’ preferences, suggesting that rational
(well-informed) decision-makers would not treat the default signal as having any informational content.
Nonetheless, decision-makers might mistakenly construe the default as a suggestion by the planner and treat
it as containing some informational content. One possibility is that decision-makers treat the suggestion as
“take it or leave it” advice – i.e., they either follow the suggestion exactly or ignore it altogether, perhaps by
gathering so much information on their own that the original suggestion has negligible signal value. Such a
model is isomorphic to the status quo bias model when the default has no true signal value. Alternatively,
decision-makers may take the suggested option into account, even if they do not accept it, and choose
something closer to the default than what they otherwise would have chosen. In this case, the default affects
decision-making like an anchor, where the effect of the default on a decision-maker’s behavior depends on the
strength of the decision-maker’s prior and the weight the decision-maker attaches to the default-as-signal.
1.2 Empirical Plausibility
In practice, it is often difficult to directly test the axiomatic foundations of particular behavioral models.
With respect to models of default effects, for example, difficulties may arise because individuals have het-
erogeneous preferences and opt-out costs, or it may be impossible to observe the same individual choosing
under alternative defaults.
One prediction of our model that, with modest additional structure, does lend itself to testing is the
idea that fewer individuals will select any given option when the default is close to that option than when
the default is far from that option. Formally, this prediction can be stated as follows: Suppose that the
15Technically, models of anchoring violate the axiom that Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) label Status Quo Independence.
16Bernheim, Fradkin and Popov (2015) estimate a model incorporating anchoring and a fixed cost of opting out of the default,
and note that the fit of the model improves somewhat when allowing for anchoring. However, at least some of this improvement
in fit is mechanical, since the anchoring effect represents a new free parameter that can help explain why individuals choose the
default.
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menu X is ordered, and ui(·) is single-peaked. Then for any two defaults d′ and d ∈ X such that d′ > d,
P (xi(d) = x) ≥ P (xi(d′) = x) for x > d′ , and P (xi(d) = x) ≤ P (xi(d′) = x) for x < d.
Evidence consistent with this prediction has been documented across a range of settings, including: 401(k)
contributions (e.g., Madrian and Shea 2001, Figure IIc; Choi et al., 2006, Figure 2), charitable contributions
(Altmann et al., 2016); taxi ride tips (Haggag and Paci, 2014); and even thermostat temperature settings in
office buildings (Brown et al., 2013). These findings support the empirical relevance of the class of behavioral
models we study. Notably, the anchoring model of defaults discussed in Section 1.1 makes the opposite
prediction, suggesting for example that we should observe P (xi(d) = x) < P (xi(d′) = x) for x > d′ > d, at
least at values of x that are sufficiently close to d′.
2 Characterizing the Optimal Default
In this section we characterize the optimal default in terms of the components of our model.
2.1 Generic Welfare Comparisons
We begin by examining how changes in the default affect welfare. The welfare achieved under any default
can be decomposed between two groups: (1) active choosers selecting x∗i and incurring normative costs piiγi,
and (2) passive choosers selecting d:
W (d) = E[ui(x
∗
i )− piiγi | ai(d) > 0] (1− Fa;d(0)) + E[ui(d) | ai(d) ≤ 0]Fa;d(0), (4)
Consider a change in the default from d0 to d1. From (4), it is apparent that this change affects welfare
directly for passive choosers, for whom it changes the option they select, and may also affect the composition
of active and passive decision-makers. To study the welfare effects of this change, it will be useful to partition
the population into four groups of decision-makers based on their behavior under the old default (d0) and
the new default (d1):
Group
Behavior when default is:
Characterization
d0 d1
Always Active (AA) ai(d0) > 0 ai(d1) > 0 ui(x∗i )−max{ui(d0), ui(d1)} > γi
Always Passive (PP) ai(d0) ≤ 0 ai(d1) ≤ 0 ui(x∗i )−min{ui(d0), ui(d1)} ≤ γi
Active-to-Passive (AP) ai(d0) > 0 ai(d1) ≤ 0 ui(x∗i )− ui(d0) > γi ≥ ui(x∗i )− ui(d1)
Passive-to-Active (PA) ai(d0) ≤ 0 ai(d1) > 0 ui(x∗i )− ui(d1) > γi ≥ ui(x∗i )− ui(d0)
The table describes how the composition of these four groups is determined in terms of the behavioral
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parameters from Equation (2). We denote the fraction of the population in each of these groups by p(j)
for j ∈ {AA, PP, PA, AP}. The following proposition uses this decomposition to characterize the welfare
effect of a change in default.
Proposition 1. For any two defaults d0, d1 ∈ X:
W (d1)−W (d0) = E [ui(x∗)− ui(d0)− piiγi |PA] p(PA)− E [ui(x∗)− ui(d1)− piiγi |AP ] p(AP )
+E [ui(d1)− ui(d0) |PP ] p(PP )
(5)
Several features of (5) are worth noting. First, the always-active choosers, group AA, do not enter into
(5); these individuals incur the same normative cost (piiγi) and make the same choice (x∗i ) under both
defaults. Second, for those who are passive at d0 and active at d1 (group PA), the change induces a utility
gain from choosing actively, ui(x∗i ) − ui(d0), but also causes them to incur normative cost piiγi. The first
term in equation (5) reflects the change in social welfare from these individuals. The second term is the
analogous contribution from individuals who are active at d0 but not at d1 (group PA). The third term
reflects individuals who are passive under both defaults (group PP); the net welfare effect for this group
depends on whether they (on average) prefer the new default or the original default.
One instructive special case concerns the situation in which all individuals prefer the same option, x∗i = x∗
for all i. Not surprisingly, the optimal policy is such cases is to set the default equal to decision-makers’ most-
preferred option, regardless of the pi′is. Intuitively, complete preference homogeneity eliminates normative
ambiguity because it avoids the need to compare the welfare of active choosers with the welfare of passive
choosers; this is because no one incurs (potentially normative) opt-out costs.
Note that Proposition 1 holds regardless of the nature of the menu X – it might be discrete, continuous,
or of multiple dimensionality. The next result considers situations where X is a real interval, which occurs
in many applied contexts.
Proposition 2. Let X be any interval in R, and suppose ui(x) is everywhere differentiable for all i. If d∗
represents an interior solution to the optimal default problem, the following first-order condition is satisfied:
0 = W
′
(d∗) = E[(1− pii)γi | ai(d∗) = 0, u′i(d∗) < 0] fa|u′<0(0)Fu′(0)
− E[(1− pii)γi | ai(d∗) = 0, u′i(d∗) > 0] fa|u′>0(0) (1− Fu′(0))
+ E [u′(d∗) | ai(d∗) < 0] Fa;d∗(0)
(6)
where fa|u′>0 is the probability density function of ai(d∗) conditional on u′i(d∗) > 0; Fu′ is the cumulative
density function of u′i(d∗); and Fa;d∗ is the cumulative density function of ai(d∗).
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As in Proposition 1, the three terms represent the welfare effects of the default change on decision-
makers in the AP , PA, and PP groups. The first term represents the PA group; a decision-maker for whom
ai(d) = 0 and u
′
i(d) < 0 will be passive at the original default and active following a marginal increase in
the default (which they prefer slightly less than the original default). Similarly, the second term represents
decision-makers in the AP group, who are slightly better off after the marginal increase in the default, and
therefore more willing to acquiesce to it. Decision-makers in the third, inframarginal group, with ai(d) < 0,
remain passive even after a small change in the desirability of the default.
How does the normative share of as-if costs affect the optimal default? Proposition 2 highlights that pi
matters for weighting the relative welfare effects of a change in the default for decision-makers in the PA
and AP groups against the welfare effects for decision-makers in the PP group. When pii = 1, the welfare
effects depend only on decision-makers in the PP group, who experience a marginal change in welfare from
moving to a slightly better or slightly worse default. The reason why is that decision-makers in the PA and
AP groups behave as though they are indifferent between following the default and making an active choice
(ai(d) = 0). When pii = 1 for decision-makers in these groups, that behavior fully reflects their welfare, and
the envelope theorem implies that their welfare is not affected by a policy change that makes them active or
passive. In contrast, when pii < 1, the welfare of the PA and AP groups will be weighted more heavily in
determining the optimal default, because although these groups are small because they are on the margin
of choosing actively, their welfare changes discretely when they begin or cease to choose actively. The next
two sections further explore how the optimal policy depends on pii.
2.2 Forcing Active Choice
This Section applies our framework to evaluate the desirability of policies that induce decision-makers to
make active choices. In practice, such policies might take the form of (1) a “penalty default” (Ayres and
Gertner, 1989) set to an option so undesirable that virtually all decision-makers opt out, or (2) restricting
the opportunity set so that decision-makers are forced to make an active choice (e.g., Carroll et al., 2009).
As an example of the former approach, one could imagine setting intestacy law – law governing inheritances
in the absence of a will – so that individuals who die without leaving a will would have all of their assets
taxed at a 100% rate. An example of the latter approach would be requiring new employees to make an
active decision about how much to contribute to their 401(k) plans as a condition of employment.17 For
convenience, we will model both types of policies as penalty defaults, since their effects are the same under
our assumptions.
17Other ways to promote active choice are to reduce the costs of opting out of a default, considered by Chesterley (2017), or
taxing decision-makers who select the default option, considered by BFP.
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Formally, we define a penalty default as some option dp ∈ X for which ai(d) > 0 for all i. It is straight-
forward to show that whenever ui(dp) is sufficiently low for all individuals, dp will be a penalty default.
Compare a change in the default to a penalty default dp from an arbitrary alternative d. Using Proposition
1, we have
W (dp)−W (d) = E[ui(x∗)− ui(d)− piiγi|PA] p(PA) (7)
Because individuals are never passive at dp, only the first term of (5) matters for welfare. The following
proposition stems from (7) and illustrates the importance of resolving normative ambiguity when policies
that promote active choice are available:
Proposition 3. Suppose that X is any menu and there exists a penalty default dp ∈ X. There exist
thresholds pi ∈ [0, 1) and pi ∈ (0, 1] such that
(3.1) pii ≤ pi for all i implies dp maximizes social welfare over all d ∈ X.
(3.2) pii ≥ pi for all i implies dp minimizes social welfare over all d ∈ X.
Proposition 3 shows that when forcing active choice is a feasible policy, it is never possible to identify
the optimal default without taking a stance on whether or to what degree opt-out costs are normative.18
Moreover, the stakes are high: forcing active choices can be either the best or the worst possible outcome
for social welfare, depending on what pi turns out to be.
To interpret (3.1), start from the benchmark case where pii = 0 for everyone. In that case, forcing active
choice results in everyone receiving the option they prefer and no one incurring any normative opt-out costs.
The result in (3.1) generalizes this idea to the case where pi is small but not necessarily zero. In contrast,
(3.2) implies that forcing active choice is extremely undesirable under high values of pi. Note that when pii
is sufficiently close to 1 for all i, the right-hand side of (7) must be negative, because individuals who are
passive at default d have ui(x∗) − ui(d) < γi. Such individuals reveal a preference for choosing passively.
Hence, when pii is sufficiently close to 1 for all i, forcing active choice is dominated by every other potential
default.
2.3 Minimizing Opt-Outs
A frequently discussed rule of thumb for setting defaults, proposed by Thaler and Sunstein (2003), is to select
as the default whichever option minimizes the number of decision-makers who opt-out. In our notation, the
opt-out minimizing default, dm, is defined as the value of d that maximizes: Wm(d) ≡ Fa;d(0), where,
18The case in which x∗i is homogeneous is a knife’s edge exception to this statement. In that case, setting d = x
∗ achieves
the highest possible social welfare for any value of pi – including tying dp when pii = 0 ∀i.
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as above, Fa;d(·) is the cumulative density function of ai(d), i.e. the fraction of the population choosing
passively under default d.
Evaluating this expression at two possible defaults, d0 and d1, it is straightforward to derive that under
Wm, social welfare is improved by changing the default from d0 to d1 if and only if p(PA) < p(AP ). That
is, the default change must cause more decision-makers to become passive than it causes to become active.
To illustrate how this condition relates to welfare in our model, note that we may decompose (5) as:
W (d1)−W (d0) = (p(AP )− p(PA))piγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ p(AP )E [piiγi − piγ |AP ]− p(PA)E [piiγi − piγ |PA]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+E[ui(x
∗)− ui(d0)|PA] p(PA)− E[ui(x∗)− ui(d1)|AP ] p(AP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
+E[ui(d1)− ui(d0)|PP ] p(PP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
(8)
where piγ = E[piiγi]. As an initial matter, note that term 1 compares p(AP ) and p(PA) exactly as in Wm.
Individuals who are active at d1 but not d0 (group PA) will incur opt-out costs under d1 valued at piγ, which
has a negative effect on their welfare. The opposite is true for the AP group, who incur costs under d0 but
not d1. Term 1 therefore favors whichever default minimizes opt-outs. When all of the other terms in 8 are
negligible or have the same sign as the first term, the opt-out minimizing default coincides with the optimal
default.
The other terms in 8 represent factors that may cause the optimal default to diverge from the default
that minimizes opt-outs. Term 2 reflects the fact that even when the size of the AP and PA groups are
similar, the magnitude of the normative opt-out costs of each may differ. Similarly, term 3 reflects that,
aside from whatever cost they incur from being active, the utility gain from being active may differ across
the AP and PA groups. Finally, the fourth term captures how the change in the default affects welfare for
the decision-makers who remain passive. Notably, the preferences of this group are completely neglected by
the minimizing opt-outs rule, even though the choices of this group are directly affected by a change in the
default. When the preferences of group PP differ systematically from those of the PA and AP groups, the
default selected by Wm may be sub-optimal because it fails to reflect the preferences of the decision-makers
who remain passive under both defaults. Hence, when the PP group is large and tends to prefer defaults
that induce many decision-makers to opt-out, the minimizing opt-outs rule of thumb may perform poorly.
The following proposition provides sufficient conditions under which minimizing opt-outs yields the op-
timal default:
Proposition 4. Suppose that X = [xmin, xmax] ⊆ R and that:
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(A4.1) As-if costs γi are distributed independently of x∗i .
(A4.2) Preferences are given by ui(x) = u(x−x∗i ) for some map u : R→ R, with u′(0) = 0, u′′ < 0 and
u(c) = u(−c) for any c.
(A4.3) x∗i follows a single-peaked and symmetric distribution about some mode xm.
Under these conditions, there exists a threshold pi ∈ (0, 1] such that pii ≥ pi for all i implies that the optimal
default is the default that minimizes opt-outs.
Proposition 4 provides conditions under which minimizing opt-outs yields the optimal policy. Loosely
speaking, these conditions occur when as-if costs are sufficiently normative, the distributions of the underlying
behavioral parameters are independent, and decision-makers’ preferences are symmetric and single-peaked.
We can understand the sufficient conditions in terms of their implications for the various terms in Equation
(8). In particular, (A4.1) rules out a relationship between as-if costs γi and preferences that could cause
the sign of term 2 in Equation (8) to have the opposite sign of term 1. Next, (A4.2) makes the comparison
of the utility differences in the last two terms of Equation (8) straightforward, as all heterogeneity in ui(·)
derives from heterogeneity in the distribution of optimal choices x∗i . Third, (A4.3) rules out features of the
distribution of x∗i that could pull the optimal default away from the opt-out-minimizing default via the third
and fourth terms in Equation (8). Together, (A4.2) and (A4.3) guarantee that the effect of a change in the
default in opt-outs among the PA and AP groups in (8) is a strong signal about the change in welfare of the
PP group. The symmetry assumptions in (A4.2) and (A4.3) ensure that, when d = xm, (1) the effect of a
marginal change in the default on the AP and PA groups cancel each other out, and (2) for every member
of the PP group made better off by a marginal change in the default, there is another member of that group
made worse off by the same amount. These cancellations ensure that the first-order condition for xm to be
a local optimum is satisfied. Given these assumptions, all that remains is to examine when d = dm is indeed
the global optimum, which is guaranteed for sufficiently high pi.19
Together, Propositions 3 and 4 imply that, under the regularity conditions in (A4.1) - (A4.3), the optimal
policy rule is relatively simple. When pi is sufficiently large, the social planner should minimize opt-outs.
When pi is sufficiently small, the social planner should force active choice. For intermediate values of pi, other
policies may be optimal. When the conditions in (A4.1)-(A4.3) are not satisfied, minimizing opt-outs may
not be optimal for large pi, but one can use the expression in Equation 8 to correct for asymmetries in u(·)
or the distribution of x∗, or a correlation between as-if costs γi and optimal choices x∗i .
19BFP show that a distinct factor that tends to favor minimizing opt-outs when as if costs are normative is the presence of
agglomerations in the distribution of x∗, such as might occur in a 401(k) savings context with an employer match (see BFP
Theorem 2).
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Figure 1: Social Welfare with Quadratic Preferences and Gaussian x∗i
Note: This figure plots social welfare,W (d), for a simulated model in which u(x−x∗i ) = −α(x−xi)2 with α = 0.25, x∗i ∼ N(0, 1),
and γi = 1 for all individuals. We assume pii is homogeneous across decision-makers, and we plot W (d) for several values of
pi. Setting d = E[x∗i ] = 0 will minimize opt-outs in this model, and setting an extreme default will force active choices. The
simulation illustrates that the optimal policy follows a threshold rule over pi in this model, so that minimizing opt-outs is
optimal for high values of pi and forcing active choice is optimal for low values of pi.
Figure (1) plots social welfare for a stylized model that satisfies (A4.1)-(A4.3). To fill out the model,
we assume that pii is uniform across decision-makers, x∗i follows a Gaussian distribution in the population,
and u(x − x∗i ) is quadratic – i.e., u(x − x∗i ) = −α(x − x∗i )2 for suitably chosen α > 0. To interpret the
figure, recall that forcing active choice is equivalent in the model to selecting a default sufficiently extreme
that all decision-makers choose to opt out, and, because we plot W (d) assuming that xm = 0, setting a
default of zero will minimize opt-outs. The figure shows that as pi varies, the default that minimizes opt-outs
remains a local optimum; the feature that varies with pi is the relative attractiveness of forcing active choice.
As suggested by the figure, the optimal policy in this stylized setting takes the form of a threshold rule
around some threshold pi ≈ 0.2. When pi > pi, setting the default to minimize opt-outs is optimal. Instead,
when pi < pi, the optimal policy is to force active choice. Our results in this section also shed additional
light on previous results from the literature. Specifically, Carroll et al. (2009) consider the optimal policy
within a model of default effects similar to the one we describe in Section 1.1, where present bias magnifies
opt-out costs relative to true opt-out costs and the individual is a sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounter
according to some (homogeneous) factor β. The authors add some additional structure to the model, namely
a uniform distribution of costs over some finite interval (c.f. our Assumption A3.1), quadratic loss preferences
(c.f. our assumption A3.2), and a uniform density of optimal choices x∗i over some finite interval (c.f. our
assumption A3.3). Within this model, they show that active choices are optimal when (1) β is sufficiently low
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and (2) optimal choices (x∗i ) are sufficiently heterogeneous. Conversely, when (1) β is sufficiently high and
(2) preferences are less heterogeneous, the optimal choice will tend to be a “center default” that minimizes
opt-outs (c.f. xm in Proposition 4). Recall from Section 1.1. that in the sophisticated present-bias model
of default effects , pi = β. Our Proposition 3 therefore illuminates the generic reason why active choices are
optimal when β is low: these are the cases in which as-if costs are deemed normatively irrelevant. Similarly,
our Proposition 4 illuminates the generic reason why minimizing opt-outs is optimal when β ≈ 1.
2.4 Measuring the Normative Share of Opt-Out Costs
This section has described how optimal policy turns on the share of opt-out costs that are welfare-relevant.
Because this parameter typically cannot be directly inferred from data, our proposed approach is to derive
optimal policy as a function of the normative share of opt-out costs; doing so allows policymakers and
advocates to assess the assumptions on which alternative policies lie. Still, depending on the setting, various
data can be informative on the share of opt-out costs that are normative. For example, one might identify
how opt-out costs affect a decision-maker’s welfare by extrapolating from the decision-maker’s choices in
other settings, such as how much the decision-maker is willing to pay to avoid undertaking tasks that are
similar to opting out of a default like filling out other paperwork or making active decisions with similar
complexity. Alternatively, one could try to learn how opting out affects welfare more directly, such as by
estimating the effect of opting out of a default on decision-makers’ subjective well-being. Of course, both
of these approaches have weaknesses: other choices made by the decision-maker might differ in important
ways or might themselves be biased. How opt-outs affect subjective well-being is difficult to measure and
may miss other welfare-relevant features of the choice. But in some settings, these approaches may provide
clues as to the range of plausible values for pi.
3 Mistaken Active Choices
Thus far we have restricted our focus to optimization frictions that arise because a default is present. That
is, although our model has allowed decision-makers to err in deciding whether to opt-out of a default, we have
assumed that those decision-makers who do opt out go on to choose optimally from the available options.
However, choices may also be distorted by biases unrelated to default effects. In the retirement savings
decision, for example, present-biased employees may under-save even when making an active choice.
18
3.1 Modeling Internalities
To incorporate this possibility into our model, we continue to assume that behavior is described by Equation
(1) but now assume that welfare is given by
wi(x) = ui(x) +mi(x) + piiγi1{x6=d}, (9)
where mi(x) is the internality imposed on the individual by his or her choice of x – i.e., the component of
the welfare effect of x that is not taken into account by the decision-maker. Here, ai(d) > 0 =⇒ xi(d) = xai .
The active choice, xai , maximizes ui(x) but not ui(x) +mi(x) due to the internality.
For simplicity, we focus on the case in which X is a real interval and assume that both ui(x) and mi(x)
are differentiable. In the retirement savings example, for an active chooser who under-saves, we would have
u′i(x
a
i ) = 0 and m′i(xai ) > 0. Indirect utility and social welfare are defined as above. We will describe how the
optimal policy changes with the addition of internalities, first in general and then under some restrictions
that provide additional intuition. Let W
′
0(d) be the effect of a marginal change in the default on welfare in






0(d) + E [mi(x
a
i )−mi(d) |PA] P (PA)
−E [mi(xai )−mi(d) |AP ] P (AP ) + E [m′i(d) |PP ] P (PP ).
(10)
There are two changes in this expression relative to the one in Proposition 2. First, the PA and AP groups
experience a discrete change in the internality from becoming active or becoming passive as the default
changes. Second, the always-passive (PP ) group in the last term of Equations (10) experience an additional
marginal welfare effect, m′i, from the change in the default. As before, the welfare of always-active choosers
does not enter into the evaluation of the welfare effect of a change in the default.
In order to compare optimal policy with and without internalities, it is instructive to place additional
simplifying restrictions on mi(x). The following proposition illustrates how the presence of internalities
affects the determination of the optimal default derived above:
Proposition 5. In the model with internalities, suppose that
(A5.1) For all i, ui(x) = −α2 (x− xai )2 with α > 0.
(A5.2) Normative preferences are given similarly by ui(x) +mi(x) = −α2 (x− x∗i )2.
(A5.3) The error in active choice xai − x∗i is independent of xai and γi.
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denotes social welfare without internalities (Equation 6), µ = E[m′i(xi(d))], and X(d) = E[xi(d)].
Proposition 5 highlights that optimal policy considerations here balance the concerns of the previous
model, summarized by W
′
0(d), with a new goal, which is to correct the internality generated by the decisions
of the active choosers. For example, if µ > 0 represents the average degree of under-saving among a
population of decision-makers, the optimal savings contribution default would induce more saving than
when the social planner assumed no internalities were present. The larger the mean marginal internality,
µ, the further the deviation from the no-internality optimum. In addition, it is straightforward to show
that ∂E[xi(d)]∂d = E [x
a
i − d|PA] P (PA) + E [d− xai |AP ] P (AP ) + P (PP ). In words, the effect of a change
in the default on total activity (X) has two components. First, both of the marginally active groups choose
discretely lower xi – recall that xai < d for the PA group, and xai > d for the AP group. Second, the
always-passive group experiences a marginal increase in xi.
To understand how optimal policy differs in this model relative to the model without internalities, suppose
we initially have a default dˆ that is optimal when no internalities are present, so W
′
0(dˆ) = 0. If, as in the
under-saving example, µ > 0, then a deviation from this default in whichever direction increases X(d) would
constitute an improvement in social welfare. Importantly, whether total activity increases with an increase
in the default or with a decrease in the default is an empirical question. One might presume that the
presence of positive internalities from saving would lead the planner to prefer a higher default savings rate,
but the results here shows that this intuition is only correct when there are relatively few marginally active
choosers. In the case where total saving is relatively unaffected by the default, the presence of internalities
from under-saving is actually irrelevant for the optimal default.
The assumptions under which Proposition 5 holds are instructive but not guaranteed. Assumptions
(A5.1) and (A5.2) make the problem more tractable by ensuring that the internality is approximately linear.
Assumption (5.3) ensures that the marginal internality µi ≡ m′i(x) is independent of other structural param-
eters governing individual behavior (though not necessarily of the other parameter summarizing mistakes,






′(d) + E[µi − µ|PP ]P (PP )
+E[(µi − µ)(xai − d)|PA]P (PA)− E[(µi − µ)(xai − d)|AP ]P (AP )
(11)
Equation (11) shows how to modify the expression in Proposition 5 to account for the fact that the mean
marginal internality may be different across the three groups of decision-makers we are interested in. For
example, individuals with high values of γi, who are particularly sensitive to defaults, might be particularly
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bad under-savers. In this case, the last term of Equation (11) would become more important, as the PP
group have higher values of γi than the other groups. Such a modification would make higher defaults more
attractive on the margin, relative to the expression in Proposition 5. Alternatively, we might suppose that
individuals with low values of xai are especially bad under-savers. As individuals with low xai tend to be in
the PA group, this modification would make the third term in Equation (11) larger, making an increase in
the default less attractive on the margin.
In addition to affecting the optimal default, the presence of internalities affects the desirability of forcing
active choice. As in Section 2.2, we can compare a penalty default dp and a generic default d. Adapting
Equation (7) to the case of internalities yields:
W (dp)−W (d0) = E [ui(xa)− ui(d)− piiγi +mi(xai )−mi(d) |PA] p(PA) (12)
Unlike in Proposition 3.1, it is no longer the case that a sufficiently small value of pi guarantees that dp is the
optimal default. To see why, suppose that pii = 0 for all individuals. As before, we know that ui(xai ) > ui(d).
However, it may be the case that mi(xai ) < mi(d). When the difference mi(d)−mi(xai ) is sufficiently large
for enough individuals, d will be a better default than dp. In the under-saving example, it is possible –
though not assured – that a default under which some individuals choose passively will increase total saving
relative to an active choice regime to such an extent that the active choice regime is not optimal, even when
as-if costs are completely irrelevant for welfare.
To summarize, incorporating mistakes by active choosers into the model means that the planner may
be able to raise social welfare by choosing a default that makes those mistakes less likely to occur, and
reduces the benefits of penalty defaults that cause decision-makers to choose actively. Once internalities
are considered, the case for active choice policies hinges on decision-makers making enough of one type of
mistake (i.e., over-weighting the costs of opting out of a default) but not making too much of a different
type of mistake (i.e., making a biased choice when selecting among non-default options). Uncertainty by the
planner over the distribution of mi(x) thus creates a new difficulty for determining the optimal default that
parallels the normative ambiguity caused by uncertainty over pi.
3.2 Measuring Internalities
We have shown how the degree to which decision-makers make privately suboptimal choices affects optimal
default policy, but empirically estimating such internalities is widely acknowledged to be one of the central
challenges in behavioral public economics. When the optimal default depends on the degree to which
internalities are present, there are several approaches one might take for estimating this parameter from
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data. First, an observer might investigate a potential internality by focusing on choices made in other
contexts that do not exhibit the same biases; for example, decision-makers might be observed in a setting
in which the feature of the choice environment suspected of causing a bias is known to be absent. Similarly,
one might estimate the structural parameters that govern preferences over some menu by observing other
choices made in a related domain. Alternatively (and more basically), one might simply ask people about
their preferences or well-being; although such an approach can itself be biased, in some cases it may shed
light on welfare when decision-makers’ observed choices do not. Finally, a researcher might identify decision-
makers’ unbiased preferences by extrapolating from other decision-makers whose decisions are thought to
be unbiased, such as subject-matter experts or those not subject to framing effects (Bronnenberg et al.,
2013; Allcott, Lockwood and Taubinsky, 2019). For all of these approaches, once decision-makers’ true (i.e.,
welfare-relevant) preferences are known, they can be compared to the preferences revealed by their choice
behavior to infer the presence and magnitude of any internality. As others have emphasized, the feasibility
and convincingness of these alternative approaches varies widely by application.
4 Empirical Illustration
This section illustrates our results using data on 401(k) plan contribution decisions. We choose to focus
on this setting for two reasons. The first is that it is a setting in which defaults have been shown to affect
behavior and in which the choice of default is of significant practical importance. The second is that it has
been the focus of a recent and influential literature on optimal default policy; holding the setting constant
in our analysis relative to this prior literature helps clarify the value added by our approach.
To preview our results, we draw two substantive conclusions from this analysis. First, we generalize the
result from BFP that the uncertainty over optimal defaults is small when the range of policies considered
does not include policies that promote active choice. Specifically, we estimate the mapping between values
of pi and the optimal default. This allows us to conclude that the optimal policy BFP identifies applies not
only for the illustrative models they consider, but rather for all behavioral models within a more general
class (i.e., any model that is consistent with the opt-out cost representation). Our second contribution is to
show that, in contrast to the results in BFP, normative ambiguity does generate meaningful uncertainty as
to optimal policy once the policy space is expanded to include policies that promote active choice. When
the as-if costs associated with default effects are mostly irrelevant from a welfare perspective, the optimal
policy is to adopt a penalty default (e.g., setting a very high default contribution rate) or to require active
choice as a condition of employment. In contrast, these policies are dominated when even a modest fraction
of the observed as-if opt-out costs are normatively relevant. Finally, we discuss additional analyses that help
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to resolve the normative ambiguity over pi, and we discuss how the planner’s uncertainty over pi matters for
welfare. The illustration also highlights two of the chief benefits of our approach, namely the simplicity with
which it can be applied and the transparency between our assumptions and the welfare conclusions that
emerge.
Empirical Setup. The data we use consists of 401(k) contribution rates for newly eligible employees of
several firms first analyzed by Choi et al. (2004, 2006) and Beshears et al. (2008).20 We describe the relevant
features of these data here and refer readers to the earlier studies for additional detail. The first step in
our approach is to estimate the distribution of parameters in the opt-out cost representation of behavior.
To do so, we follow BFP and rely on a structural as-if cost model fitted on employee contribution rate
data for each employer. This model assumes preferences over individual contribution rates are ui(x) =
ρi ln(x + M(x) + α) + ln(z), where ρi and α are preference parameters governing the overall preference for
contributing and the price sensitivity of contributions respectively,M(x) is the employer match as a function
of x, and z = 1− (1− t)x is residual income pinned down by the budget constraint. We assume a marginal
tax rate t of 20 percent. The firm matches 50 percent of employee contributions up to 6 percent of earnings,
so we have M(x) = 0.5x for x ≤ 0.06 and M(x) = 0.5 ∗ 0.06 for x > 0.06.
Estimating this model structurally requires assumptions about the distribution of ρi and γi. First, we
assume these two variables are independent.21 Second, we assume that γ follows an exponential distribution,
modified to have a point mass λ1 at zero, with cdf Φ(γ) = λ1 +(1−λ1)(1−e−λ2γ) for γ ≥ 0 and Φ(γ) = 0 for
γ < 0. Thus, a fraction λ1 of individuals are assumed to have zero as-if costs and choose actively under all
defaults. Third, we assume ρi follows a censored normal distribution: ρi = max{0, ρ˜} where ρ˜ is distributed
normally with mean µρ and variance σ2.
The cap on the employer match creates a large kink in the budget constraint at 6 percent of earnings, which
induces bunching in the optimal contribution rate at 6 percent. The degree of bunching implicitly identifies
the price sensitivity preference parameter, α. The model also predicts bunching at the corner solutions of
0 and the maximum contribution rate of 15 percent. Finally, we evaluate W (d) using equivalent variation
relative to a benchmark in which all individuals receive their most-preferred option x∗i without incurring any
costs of opting out of a default, so that indirect utility is vi(d) = ui(xi(d)) − piiγ1{xi(d) 6= d} − ui(x∗i ). As
the units of xi are in percentages of annual salaries contributed to a 401(k) plan, the units of welfare thus
correspond to the fraction of annual salary that would make individuals receiving x∗i (without any costs)
20For simplicity, we present results for a single firm only (the one labeled “Company 3” in BFP). Results for the other firms
are very similar and are presented in the Online Appendix.
21This assumption allows us to extrapolate from the decisions of active choosers at some defaults, whose decisions are
informative about ρ, to the population of decision-makers. As the active decision-makers will tend to have low γi, covariance
between ρi and γi poses a challenge to identifying the preferences of passive choosers (Goldin and Reck, 2018).
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willing to switch to a default d. Because welfare is lower under a given default d than under the benchmark,
equivalent variation is typically negative. Throughout the analysis, we assume a uniform value of pii for the
population, denoted pi for simplicity. The calculation of welfare for any distribution of pii, including those in
which it covaries with other heterogeneous parameters, is straightforward.
Results. We first use the structural model to estimate the distribution of as if opt-out costs (γi). We
estimate that 60 percent of employees have strictly positive opt-out costs. Among this group, the mean
opt-out cost is $3,386 for an employee with the median salary in the data ($40,000). We estimate a mean
opt-out cost for all employees of about 5.07 percent of their salary, or $2,028 at the median salary. Ten
percent of all employees have as-if costs greater than 15 percent of their salary, i.e. $6,000 for an employee
with median salary.
We next use this estimated distribution of as if opt-out costs to solve for the optimal default as a
function of pi. Figure 2a depicts equivalent variation for alternative default contribution rates between 0 and
15 percent of earnings, for values of pi ranging from zero to one. We find that regardless of pi, the optimal
policy is to set a default of 6 percent of earnings, which is where, for all three firms, employer matching
contributions are maximized. This analysis generalizes the main finding in BFP to any positive model of
default effects consistent with the opt-out cost representation, and to any view of welfare within such a
model. The large kink in the welfare functions at a 6 percent default contribution in Figure 2a arises because
of the large kink in the budget constraint at 6 percent, due to the employer match. Without the match, there
is no such kink in welfare and the optimal default tends toward the middle of the distribution of individual
preferences for saving, governed by the parameter ρi. Relatedly, because the employer match exerts such
a strong influence on welfare, these estimates are robust to very different distributions of ρi. As a result,
concerns about how to identify heterogeneous underlying preferences over saving are immaterial here. This
is a fortunate coincidence in the 401(k) context and not a general feature of the optimal default problem.
We next extend the analysis to consider policies that promote active choice. To do so, we expand the range
of contribution rate defaults we consider. As suggested by Proposition 3, extending the analysis in this way
causes the optimal policy to depend on pi. As shown in Figure 2b, extremely high defaults dominate when
pi is low, but the 6 percent default dominates when pi is moderate or large.22 There is a strong qualitative
similarity between the stylized model in Figure 1 and the estimated model in Figure 2b; the main difference
between these is the kink in the latter at the 6 percent default, which is caused by the kink in the budget
22A similar phenomenon is evident in Figures A.7 to A.12 in the Online Appendix of BFP, who do not focus on it because
they state that the extreme contribution rates exceed statutory limits on 401(k) contributions. However, setting an extremely
high default contribution rate is not the only way to force employees to make active choices – the employer could simply require
it as a condition of employment, as in Carroll et al. (2009). In addition, legal constraints in this policy area may be modified, as
illustrated by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which allowed employers to automatically enroll employees in 401(k) plans.
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Figure 2: Equivalent Variation by Default Contribution Rate
(a) Defaults between 0 and 15 percent of salary (b) Expanded set of contribution rates
Note: This figure depicts welfare in equivalent variation units as a function of the default contribution rate for varying
values of pi. We observe that 6 percent is the robust optimal default when we restrict the analysis to contribution
rates between 0 and 15 percent (left panel), but extreme contribution rates that promote active choice are desirable
when pi is small (right panel).
constraint from the employer match.
Figure 3 compares welfare under the 6 percent default to an active choice regime, for values of pi ranging
from zero to one. When pi = 0, the active choice regime leads to the same outcome as our benchmark in
which all individuals costlessly receive x∗i , so its equivalent variation is zero. Consistent with Propositions 3
and 4, we find that at higher values of pi, the 6 percent, employer-contribution-maximizing default dominates
the active choice default. The 6 percent default is also the default that minimizes opt-outs. The optimal
policy thus takes the form of a threshold rule: active choices dominate below the threshold, the 6 percent
default dominates above the threshold. The threshold below which active choice dominates is about pi = 0.08
for this firm.
Discussion. Because the threshold value of pi for which active choice is optimal is pi = 0.08, finding the
optimal policy requires determining whether opting out of a default reduces employee welfare by 8% or more
of the employee’s as if opt-out cost. Above, we estimate the mean opt-out cost to be $2,028 for an employee
with median salary. Eight percent of this amount is $162, which corresponds to about 0.4 percent of the
median employee salary. When opting out of the default reduces welfare by at least $162 on average, the
optimal policy is therefore to set the default to the contribution rate that minimizes opt-outs, which here
corresponds to the match-maximizing rate of 6%. In contrast, if the normative component of opt-out costs
is below $162 on average, the optimal policy is to promote active choice, either by setting the default to
an extremely high contribution rate, or, perhaps more realistically, requiring employees to make an active
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Figure 3: Welfare Under Active Choice versus Minimizing Opt-Outs in 401(k) Plans
Note: This figure compares welfare under the 6 percent contribution default with welfare under an active choice
regime. At low values of pi, the active choice regime leads to higher welfare.
choice as a condition of employment.23
Identifying the normative component of opt-out costs poses a methodological challenge since it cannot
be directly inferred from observed choice data. As discussed in Section 2.4, however, researchers may look
to other types of information for guidance. In this context, for example, an observer might estimate the
normative component of opt-out costs from choices made in other settings, which do not exhibit the same
biases from default effects. For example, one might look to the price decision-makers are willing to pay to
avoid filling out other forms or making other decisions of similar complexity, using data on the price of paid
tax preparers or financial planners. Alternatively, an observer might estimate the number of non-work hours
required to actively choose one’s contribution rate and fill out the form, and price that time according to
the employee’s implied wage rate.
In the 401(k) setting we focus on, this type of analysis suggests the normative component of as-if costs is
smaller than 8 percent, which would imply that active choice is optimal. Suppose that employees value their
time at $19 per hour, which is the equivalent hourly wage rate of an employee in our sample with median
salary and a 40-hour work week. The threshold value of $162 would imply that, on average, the process of
opting out and making an active choice would need to take more than 8 hours of the employee’s time in order
for the 6 percent default to dominate an active choice policy. We suspect that this amount of time is on
the high side of what most casual observers would consider plausible. The actual process of filling out forms
and selecting an option typically takes less than an hour, though of course researching the available options
23Our focus is on the optimal default option but we acknowledge that other policy parameters, such as the match rate, also
significantly affect welfare. Relatedly, an employer’s goal may not be solely to maximize employees private welfare (Bubb and
Warren, 2018). A higher default could increase employer’s matching contributions, and the associated cost might lead employers
to set a lower default or reduce matching contributions, relative to the optimal policy considered here. Such issues would not
be present for national automatic pension enrollment policies like those recently adopted in the United Kingdom, where the
employee’s pension contribution has no direct effect on the employer’s contribution.
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to determine which one will be best takes more time. Relatedly, given the cognitive difficulty of making
pension choices, individuals may be willing to pay more to avoid making such choices than the $19/hour
benchmark implied by their wages. Still, if we suppose the process takes 2 hours, employees would need to
value the time it takes to opt out at about $80/hour, which seems high for an individual making $40,000 per
year. These conclusions match the intuition of others as well – BFP calibrate some of their models using
parameters that effectively impose a value of pi = 0.01.
However, our results also imply a sense in which promoting active choice is riskier than minimizing opt-
outs. Figure 3 shows that minimizing opt-outs leads to equivalent variation ranging from 0.4 to 0.5 percent of
annual earnings (about $160 to $200 at the median earnings) relative to the first-best benchmark, for values
of pi from zero to one. Active choice leads to equivalent variation ranging from 0 to 4.4 percent of annual
earnings ($0 to $1,760 at the median earnings). We can incorporate this idea into our analysis by formalizing
the planner’s uncertainty over pi. Given a uniform distribution over some range of pi deemed plausible by the
planner, we can compare the expected equivalent variation between active choices and minimizing opt-outs
by integrating the difference between W (d) for these two policies in Figure 3. With a uniform distribution
over [0, 1], the expected equivalent variation from active choice is -2.3 percent of annual earnings and the
expected equivalent variation of minimizing opt-outs is -0.4 percent of earnings. The expected equivalent
variation of minimizing opt-outs is much higher partly as a consequence of Propositions 3 and 4: when pi
is small, minimizing opt-outs is sub-optimal, but remains a local optimum; in contrast, when pi is large,
active choice minimizes social welfare. More fundamentally, when minimizing opt-outs, pi only matters for
the welfare of active choosers, who tend to have low as-if costs already. When setting an active choice policy,
pi matters for the welfare of all decision-makers, even those with very high as-if costs.
Incorporating Internalities. We next consider how internalities shape the optimal 401(k) contribution
default. Whether and how much individuals’ are biased in their assessments of how much to save for
retirement is a subject of debate in the literature. On the one hand, many individuals report wishing they
saved more for retirement (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p.107); on the other hand, individuals’ actual savings
choices may be more reliable than the preferences they state when responding to surveys (Carroll et al.,
2009). Similarly, alternative methodological approaches yield quite different conclusions about the share of
individuals who are optimally saving for retirement, with estimates ranging from less than 50% (Munnell
et al., 2014) to greater than 80% (Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun, 2006). For a summary of this literature,
see Poterba (2015).24
24Much of this literature imposes strong assumptions on the content of decision-makers’ preferences. An alternative path
for shedding light on the magnitude of the internality would be to compare the distribution of actual contribution decisions to
the decisions employees make in settings where their choices are more likely to be optimal, such as those made following an
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To incorporate under-saving into our analysis, one approach would be to calibrate the magnitude of
such internalities for our population by applying the under-saving estimates reported in the literature. A
limitation of our data for this purpose is that we lack information on wealth and on contribution rates by
age. In addition, the literature does not distinguish between under-saving due to passive choices at low
defaults and under-saving for any other reason, while our results suggest that distinguishing between these
is key for understanding the optimal defaults. For these reasons, and because the literature offers no clear
guidance on the magnitude of under-saving, we focus instead on illustrating how various assumptions about
the degree of internality shape the optimal 401(k) contribution rate default.
To derive the optimal default as a function of the internality, we follow the approach described in Section
3. We assume that each individual is subject to an internality over their chosen savings rate, including
employer matching contributions, of mi(x) = µ (xi + M(xi)), for some uniform constant µ.25 We can
interpret µ in terms of a lump-sum-equivalent increase in salary in percentage terms; for example, when
µ = 0.1, the increase in the individuals’ welfare of switching from contributing 0 percent of one’s salary
to the pension to contributing 10 percent is equivalent to a lump-sum transfer of 1 percent of the worker’s
salary.
Figure 4a presents the optimal policy as a function of the internality (µ) and degree to which opt-out
costs are normative (pi). Our earlier results are nested in the case where µ = 0: the optimal policy is
active choice when pi < 0.08 and a 6 percent employee contribution otherwise. As µ increases, active choice
becomes sub-optimal for even low values of pi. The primary advantage to active choice is that it allows each
individual to select an individually optimal contribution rate; this advantage is eliminated when internalities
are sufficiently large. As µ continues to rise, the optimal default increases up to the maximum contribution
of 15 percent. This occurs because when µ is very large, the effect of an increase in the default on the saving
of (always) passive savers dominates everything else from a welfare perspective.26 This increase happens
for any value of pi, but it happens fastest when pi = 0. When pi is larger, opt-outs are costly, so the fact
that increasing the default above 6 percent also leads to an increase in opt-outs makes higher defaults less
desirable than when pi = 0.
Figure 4b illustrates this phenomenon, plotting the largest possible value of µ for which the active choice
policy is optimal over different values of pi. When µ > 0.045, the active choice policy cannot be optimal.
Recall that a value of µ = 0.045 would imply that a 10 percent increase in contributions (potentially
expert-guided retirement planning session.
25From the proof of Proposition 5, we can interpret µi ≈ −u′′(x∗i − xai ) under (A5.1) and (A5.2). Hence, the assumption
that µ is constant basically requires that the amount of under-saving under active choice, x∗i − xai , is relatively homogeneous
among employees.
26This finding is not mechanical: if the model suggested that a default below the maximum contribution maximized total
saving, then that could be the optimal default for arbitrarily large µ. Such an internal default does not exist here because the
as-if costs are quite large, so that a large number of employees remain passive for even relatively high defaults.
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Figure 4: The Influence of Internalities from Under-Saving on the Optimal Default
(a) Optimal Default by the Marginal Internality (b) How Large an Internality Makes Active Choice Sub-Optimal?
Note: This figure illustrates how internalities affect the optimal default policy. Figure (4a) depicts the optimal default
for varying values of the internality µ and three values of pi. We observe that active choices are dominated by the
6 percent default when µ is sufficiently large. As µ continues to increase, the optimal default increases up to the
maximum allowable contribution. Figure (4b) plots the highest value of µ under which the active choice policy is
optimal, for varying values of pi. As pi becomes large, the active choice policy becomes less desirable regardless of µ
because of opt-out costs. Hence, for larger pi, a smaller internality is necessary to rule out the active choice policy.
For reference, marginal internalities of 0.06, 0.12, and 0.18 correspond to the after-match savings rate being 10, 20,
and 30 percent below the optimum, respectively (see Appendix Figure 5).
including the employer match) increases the total internality by the equivalent of a lump-sum transfer of
0.45 percent of earnings. We show in Appendix Figure 5 that in our model, this value of µ corresponds to
an average degree of under-saving of approximately 7 percent (or 0.6 percent of workers’ salary). Similarly,
once pi > 0.08, our previous results imply that active choice is always sub-optimal, regardless of µ. In
contrast, for sufficiently low values of both pi and µ, active choice remains optimal. We take three main
conclusions from this analysis. First, the introduction of internalities introduces another caveat to the use
of active choice policies: if individuals are systematically biased toward under-saving, a default that induces
higher saving and relatively few opt-outs can be preferable. Second, when internalities are sufficiently large,
they can dominate all other considerations with respect to the optimal default. Finally, if the main lesson
of our previous analysis was that the optimal default pension contribution depends on difficult normative
judgments, the possibility of internalities only makes the difficulties worse. Policymakers must decide not
only whether to respect decision-makers’ revealed opt-out costs, but also whether to respect the preferences
decision-makers reveal when they make active choices.
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5 Conclusion
Uncertainty over the decision-making model that generates an observed behavior is a pervasive source of
difficulty in behavioral economics. Under a range of positive models of default effects, decision-makers’
behavior can be described using “as-if” preferences over opt-out costs revealed by their observed choices.
Revealed preference analysis can recover information about these as-if preferences, but cannot answer whether
these as-if preferences accurately reflect individuals’ welfare. Our analysis of the optimal default problem
clarifies the conditions in which optimal policy determinations do and do not depend on the degree to which
these as-if opt-out costs are normatively relevant.
Two kinds of empirical evidence can help with the normative judgments necessary to pin down optimal
defaults. The first is to use various interventions attempting to reduce or enhance default effects to shed light
on the positive mechanisms driving default effects, as in Blumenstock, Callen and Ghani (2017). Even with
such evidence, however, one must make a judgment on whether a mechanism acts by imposing normative
costs or by driving a wedge between choices and welfare. The second potential strategy is to gather external
evidence to make an informed judgment. This approach requires assumptions about what choices in other
settings, such as those that reveal the monetary value of workers’ time, or those in which workers describe a
target retirement consumption level, tell us about normative parameters. We gave examples of this type of
reasoning in our examination of pension defaults. While both of these strategies can help the planner make
an informed choice, neither can resolve the problem without external judgments about how preferences are
revealed by choices.
Finally, although the form of normative ambiguity we focus on is new, our proposed approach follows an
established tradition in public finance of parameterizing certain normative judgments. In particular, optimal
policy analyses typically incorporate judgments about the value of equity by employing social welfare weights
(Mirrlees, 1971). Indeed, optimal policy analyses can be usefully divided based on whether their prescriptions
do or do not rely on such judgments (e.g., Pareto versus non-Pareto improvements). Our results suggest that
a similar division, between policy conclusions that require resolving normative ambiguity and those that do
not, will be fruitful for “behavioral” policy analysis.
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Appendix (For Online Publication Only)
A Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1:
W (d) = E[ui(x
∗
i )− piiγi|ai(d) > 0] (1− Fa;d(0)) + E[ui(d)|ai(d) ≤ 0]Fa;d(0)
where Fa;d(·) denotes the cumulative density function of ai(d).
Proof: From the definition of the social welfare function we know that W (d) = E[vi(d)]. By the law of
iterated expectations,
W (d) = E[vi(d)|ai(d) > 0]P (ai(d) > 0) + E[vi(d)|ai(d) ≤ 0]P (ai(d) ≤ 0)
We know from the consumer’s problem and the definition of ai(d) that 1) ai(d) ≤ 0 =⇒ xi(d) = d
and 2) ai(d) > 0 =⇒ xi(d) = x∗i = arg maxui(x). Substituting these into vi(d) = wi(xi(d), d) =
ui(xi(d))− piiγi1{xi(d) 6= d} gives the result. 
Proposition 1: For any two defaults d0, d1 ∈ X:
W (d1)−W (d0) = E[ui(x∗)−ui(d0)−piiγi|PA] p(PA)−E[ui(x∗)−ui(d1)−piiγi|AP ] p(AP )+E[ui(d1)−ui(d0)|PP ] p(PP ).
Proof: We know that W (d1)−W (d0) = E[vi(d1)− vi(d0)]. We partition individuals into the four groups
(PA,AP, PP and AA) and apply the law of iterated expectations to express the change in welfare as a
probability-weighted sum over these four groups. As before, ai(d) ≤ 0 =⇒ xi(d) = d and 2) ai(d) > 0 =⇒
xi(d) = x
∗
i = arg maxui(x). In the PA group, ai(d1) > 0 so vi(d1) = ui(x∗i ) − piiγi ,and ai(d0) ≤ 0, so
vi(d0) = ui(d0). Thus E[vi(d1) − vi(d0)|PA] = E[ui(x∗) − ui(d0) − piiγi|PA]. Proceeding similarly for the
other four groups and substituting in the resulting expressions yields the desired result. 
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Proposition 2: Let X be any interval in R. If d∗ represents an interior solution to the optimal default
problem, the following first-order condition is satisfied:
0 = W
′
(d∗) = E[(1− pii)γi|ai(d∗) = 0, u′i(d∗) < 0] fa|u′<0(0)Fu′(0)
− E[(1− pii)γi|ai(d∗) = 0, u′i(d∗) > 0] fa|u′<0(0) (1− Fu′(0))
+ E [u′(d∗) | ai(d∗) < 0] Fa;d∗(0)
where fa|u′>0 is the probability density function of ai(d∗) conditional on u′i(d∗) > 0; Fu′ is the cumulative
density function of u′i(d∗); and, as above, Fa;d∗ is the cumulative density function of ai(d∗).
Proof: One can obtain this result by direct calculation of the derivative of the welfare function, as divided
into active and passive choosers in Lemma 1 (i.e. expressing the expectations as integrals and applying
Leibniz rule). One can also obtain the result by plugging in d1 = d0 + ∆d in Proposition 1, taking the limit
as ∆d approaches zero, plugging in the definitions of the primitives, and noting that the PA and AP groups
now both have ai(d) = 0, which implies that ui(x∗)− ui(d) = γi by construction. 
Proposition 3 Suppose that there exists a penalty default dp ∈ X.
(3.1) There exists a threshold pi ∈ [0, 1) such that pii ≤ pi for all i implies dp maximizes social welfare.
Proof: We will prove the existence of a threshold pi ∈ [0, 1) such that when pii ≤ pi, W (dp) ≥W (d) for any
d.
Let XA ⊂ X be the subset of X such that for any d ∈ XA, P (ai(d) ≤ 0) > 0.
Let d ∈ X be an arbitrary default. We know W (dp) ≥ W (d) is trivially true when d is also a penalty
default, i.e. d /∈ XA as then W (d) = W (dp) for any pi. Next suppose d ∈ XA, so p(PA) > 0. Let
p˜i(d) = supi∈PA(d) pii be the largest possible value of pii for the PA group for default d. We know from
Equation (7) that
W (dp)−W (d) ≥ p(PA){E[ui(x∗)− ui(d)|PA]− p˜i(d)E[γi|PA]} (13)
The RHS of this expression is a continuous and strictly monotonically decreasing function of p˜i(d) (so long
as E[γi|PA] > 0, which must be true because PA individuals choose passively). When p˜i(d) = 0, the RHS
of this expression is weakly positive because ui(x∗) ≥ ui(d) for all i.27 When p˜i(d) = 1, the RHS is strictly
negative because ui(x∗)− ui(d) < γi for all individuals that are passive at d, which is the PA group in this
27The expression is strictly positive if we presume x∗i is a unique maximum for every individual. Under this assumption, we
know that the penalty default dp is the uniquely optimal default.
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situation. The Intermediate Value Theorem then implies there is a value of p˜i(d), such that we know that
the expression on the RHS of (13) is 0. Denoting this threshold by pi(d), we have that W (dp) −W (d) ≥ 0
when pii ≤ pi(d) for all i. The result then follows from letting pi = infd∈XA pi(d), so that pii < pi implies
W (dp)−W (d) ≥ 0 for any d. 
(3.2) There exists a threshold pi ∈ (0, 1] such that pii ≥ pi for all i implies dp minimizes social welfare.
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of (3.1). For any default d, let pˆi(d) = infi∈PA(d) pii. Using
equation (7) and a similar Intermediate Value Theorem argument to the above we derive that there is a
threshold pi(d), such that pii ≥ pi(d) implies W (dp) − W (d) ≤ 0. The result then follows from letting
pi = supd∈XA pi(d). .
Proposition 4 Suppose that X = [xmin, xmax] ⊆ R and that:
(A4.1) As-if costs γi are distributed independently of x∗i .
(A4.2) Preferences are given by ui(x) = u(x−x∗i ) for some map u : R→ R, with u′(0) = 0, u′′ < 0 and
u(c) = u(−c) for any c.
(A4.3) x∗i follows a single-peaked and symmetric distribution about some mode xm.
Under these conditions, there exists a threshold pi ∈ (0, 1] such that pii ≥ pi for all i implies that the optimal
default is the default that minimizes opt-outs.
Proof: We provide the proof of the theorem for the case when pii = 1 for all i. It is straightforward to
show that if the theorem holds when pii = 1 for all i, it must hold for sufficiently high pii.
Starting from the case where pii = 1 for all i, we first prove that W ′(xm) = 0, W ′(d) > 0 for d < xm,
and W ′(d) < 0 for d > xm, which implies that W has a unique global maximum at xm. We then prove that
opt-outs are minimized under xm. We start by letting d ∈ X be some default.
Step 1: Characterizing the first and second derivative of W (d).
Let Wγ(d) = E[vi(d)|γi = γ]. By (A4.1) we know that W (d) =
´
γ
Wγ(d)f(γ)dγ. To prove our result, it
therefore suffices to prove that for any fixed γ, W
′
γ(d) = 0 if d = xm, and W ′′γ (d) < 0 always.
We first introduce some notation involving the function u(). Without loss of generality u(0) = 0. Taking
γ as given, by (A4.2) there is some unique value ξ such that u(ξ) = u(−ξ) = γ. Note that when x∗ = d− ξ,
utility at the default is given by u(d − x∗) = u(d − (d − ξ)) = u(ξ) = γ, and similarly when x∗ = d + ξ,
u(d− (d+ ξ)) = γ . By (4.2), an individual is active when x∗i ≤ d− ξ or x∗i ≥ d+ ξ.
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We next characterize W ′γ(d). For illustrative purposes, suppose pii = pi is homogeneous for all i, which is











Where f(x∗) is the pdf of x∗i . Note that f(x∗) does not depend on γ by (A4.1). Differentiating the above
with respect to d and applying u(d− x∗i ) = γ at x∗i = d− ξ or d+ ξ, we obtain




This is an analogue of Proposition 2 for some fixed γ, with the added structure of (A4.2). When pi = 1
(A4.4), the first term of this expression, which corresponds to the PA and AP groups, vanishes, leaving only








Step 2: For any constant ζ, f(d+ ζ) ≥ f(d− ζ) ⇐⇒ xm ≥ d.
Suppose xm ≥ d and take a constant ζ. If xm > d + ζ > d − ζ , the result immediately follows from
the assumption in (A4.3) that f() is single-peaked. If d + ζ ≥ xm ≥ d > d − ζ take a constant c such
that d + ζ − xm = xm − c. By symmetry about xm, f(c) = f(d + ζ). We know that c < xm, because
xm− (d+ ζ) ≤ 0. We also know that c ≥ d− ζ, because we presumed xm ≥ d. We then have xm ≥ c ≥ d− ζ.
The single-peaked assumption then implies f(d+ ζ) = f(c) ≥ f(d− ζ).
Supposing xm < d and proceeding analogously proves the converse.
Step 3: xm ≥ d ⇐⇒ W ′γ(d) ≥ 0.
Starting from equation (15), note that by (A4.2) the first term is positive (u′ > 0 when x∗ < d) and the
second term is negative (u′ < 0 when x∗ < d). We can compare the signs of the two terms in the previous





where x˜ = 2d− x∗, so that d− x∗ = −(d− x˜). We know from symmetry that when d = xm, f(x∗) = f(x˜),
so W ′(xm) = 0.
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As u′(d − x∗) > 0 in the range of integration we use above. When xm > d, the result in Step 3 implies
that f(x∗) ≥ f(x˜) for x∗ ∈ [d− ζ, d], so we know that W ′γ(d) ≥ 0. When xm < d, the result in step 2 implies
that f(x∗) ≤ f(x˜) for x∗ ∈ [d− ζ, d], and we know that W ′γ(d) ≤ 0.
Step 3 proves that there is a unique global maximum of W at xm.
Step 4: Setting d = xm minimizes opt-outs.
Let the frequency of opt-outs be given by A(d) = P (ai(d) > 0). Using ξ = u−1(γ) from before and letting
F be the cdf of x∗i , we know that
A(d) = F (d− ξ) + 1− F (d+ ξ)
Taking a derivative with respect to d, we have that
A′(d) = f(d− ξ)− f(d+ ξ).
Setting d = xm, it is straightforward to verify using (A4.3) that A′(d) = 0 if d = xm, A′(d) < 0 if d < xm,
and A′(d) > 0 if d > xm, which is sufficient to prove that xm minimizes A(d). 
Proposition 5 In the model with internalities, suppose that
(A5.1) For all i, ui(x) = −α2 (x− xai )2 with α > 0.
(A5.2) Normative preferences are given similarly by ui(x) +mi(x) = −α2 (x− x∗i )2.
(A5.3) The error in active choice xai − x∗i is independent of xai and γi.





denotes social welfare without internalities (see Equation (6)), µ = E[µi], and X(d) = E[xi(d)].
Proof Step 1: (A5.1) and (A5.2) imply that the internality m(x) is linear.










Subtracting the previous expression from this one and simplifying we obtain
mi(x) = −u′′(x∗i − xai )x+
u′′
2
(x∗2i − xa2i ). (16)
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The second term is a constant with respect to x, and may therefore be safely ignored.
Step 2: Proving the result.
The result essentially follows from Equations (10) and the following equation from the text
∂E[xi(d)]
∂d
= E [xai − d|PA] P (PA) + E [d− xai |AP ] P (AP ) + P (PP ) (17)





0(d) + E [µi(x
a
i − d) |PA] P (PA)
− E [µi(xai − d) |AP ] P (AP )
+ E [µi |PP ] P (PP ).






0(d) + µ{E[xa − d|PA]P (PA)− E[xa − d)|AP ]P (AP ) + P (PP )}
Noting that the term inside curly brackets is the expression for X ′(d) in Equation (17), we obtain the desired
result. 
B Relationship to the Axiomatization of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) provides an axiomatic characterization of a model very similar to the fixed as-if
cost model we use. Their paper seeks to rationalize status quo bias; recall that we showed in Section 1.1
that giving extra utility to the status quo is the same as having a fixed cost of not choosing the status quo
(see Section 1.1). The representation of choices used by Masatlioglu and Ok (see their equations (3) and
(4)) is isomorphic to our own (see our equation (2), and Section 1.1), with one exception: the fixed as-if cost
could depend on the default in their model. Whether and to what extent γ depends on d is difficult to test
empirically, but we know of no evidence suggesting that it does. Nevertheless, here we discuss further the
implications of our restriction that γ does not depend on d by relaxing it and examining welfare.
Consider a model that is identical to our baseline model except that the fixed cost is a function of d for
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each individual, denoted γi(d). It is straightforward to show that the derivative from Proposition 2 becomes
0 = W ′(d) = E [piiγ′i(d)|AA]P (AA)
+ E [ (1− pii)γi(d)|PA]P (PA)
− E [ (1− pii)γi(d)|AP ]P (AP )
+ E[u′(d)|PP ]P (PP ).
(18)
This expression is identical to the expression in Proposition 2 except for the first term. In our basic model,
individuals that are always active for a change in the default do not experience any change in their welfare.
When the fixed costs depend on d and pii > 0, changing the default can affect the welfare of these decision-
makers because . The analogue of equation (5) is also straightforward to derive for this model.
First, we note that the argument in Proposition 3 (see the proof above) for active choices being optimal
for sufficiently low pi is unaffected by this addition. When as-if costs are not normative, forcing active choices
still leads all individuals to receive x∗i without incurring any costs. Whether forcing active choices minimizes
welfare for sufficiently high pi is unclear. The difficulty is that the penalty default dp could in principle have
a lower fixed cost (γ(dm)) than other defaults, which can make the penalty default relatively more attractive
than some other defaults.
We know by the same logic as Proposition 4 (proof above) that the last three terms of (18) will all be zero
under (A3.1)-(A3.3) when we minimize opt-outs, and that ignoring the changes in γ(d) for active choosers
we would get to a global optimum by minimizing opt-outs when pii is sufficiently high for all individuals. The
additional term in Equation (18) therefore implies that minimizing opt-outs will not be optimal in general
when the change in γ(d) for a marginal change in the default is zero. Intuitively, if increasing the default
from the opt-out minimizing default would reduce the cost incurred by active decision-makers, we know the
aggregate effect on all other decision-makers is zero (by Proposition 3), so such an increase in the default
would be an improvement on minimizing opt-outs. For a more extreme example, suppose there is a default
d∗ such that γi(d∗) = 0 for all i. Such a default is obviously the optimal default regardless of the pii’s.28
To summarize, our result that active choices are desirable when default effects are purely driven by
behavioral frictions survives the extension implied by the model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). Minimizing
opt-outs will still be a good rule of thumb when default effects are real costs and the dependence between
the costs and the default is not too strong, but if the costs vary strongly with the default it may be possible
to improve on the opt-out minimization rule of thumb.
28When pi = 0, both the active choice policy and the default d∗ are optimal defaults.
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C Variable Opt-Out Costs
Thus far we have assumed that as-if opt-out costs are constant (for a given individual) and do not depend
on which non-default option the decision-maker selects. An alternative behavioral model is that defaults
“pull” decision-makers towards options near the default in addition to making them more likely to select the
default itself. For example, defaults may serve as an anchor (Example 1.2.7).
Ultimately, the question of whether defaults effects can be better described by including variable as-if
costs in the model is an empirical question. Empirical evidence, reviewed in Section 1.2, regularly finds that
increases in the default can affect choices far away from the default, suggesting that fixed costs are likely
present. A variable costs model alone, such as a model of anchoring and adjustment where a higher default
tends to lead to higher xi(d), would not predict, for example, that the fraction of individuals who contribute
nothing to their pension would increase when the default rate of contribution is increased. Whether adding
variable costs gives the model additional explanatory power relative to the fixed-cost-only model is more
difficult to test. One possibility is to look closely at choices around the default. The fixed costs model with
no variable cost predicts a “hole” in the observed distribution of choices around the default, whereas adding
variable costs model predicts a “hill” around the default when fixed costs are sufficiently low. Still, given
that both fixed and variable costs are plausibly heterogeneous, separately identifying these two components
of decision-makers’ revealed preferences without strong assumptions about distributions of the two costs is
difficult. Here, we show how the inclusion of a variable costs affects the conclusions of our main analysis,
especially the desirability of active choices versus minimizing opt-outs.




ui(xi)− ci(xi − d)− γ1{xi 6= d}. (19)
For simplicity, we will assume that ui is single-peaked, with u′i(x∗i ) = 0 and u′′i < 0 everywhere. For this
extension, we assume that the as-if cost associated with choosing a non-default option increases the further
the chosen option is from d, so that c′i(xi− d) ≥ 0 when xi− d > 0, and c′i(xi− d) ≤ 0 when xi− d < 0. The
as-if cost function is twice differentiable, with c′′ ≥ 0. We normalize c(0) to zero. In this model individuals
choose the default when passive, or x˜(d) = arg maxui(xi)− ci(xi − d) when active. The individual is active
if a˜i(d) ≡ [ui(x˜i(d))− ci(x˜i(d)− d)]− ui(d)− γi > 0.
Similar to before, welfare is given by
wi(x) = ui(x)− ρici(x− d)− piiγi1{xi 6= d}, (20)
40
where ρi denotes the normative relevance of variable costs ci(·) and pii the normative relevance of fixed costs
as before. Indirect utility and social welfare are also defined similarly to before.
Given any change in the default, we can divide individuals into four groups as before, except now these
groups are based on a˜i(d). Taking a derivative of the welfare function with respect to d, we have that the
necessary condition from Proposition 2 becomes, with the addition of variable costs,









+ E [ (1− ρ)c+ (1− pii)γi|PA]P (PA)
− E [ (1− ρ)c+ (1− pii)γi|AP ]P (AP )
+ E[u′(d)|PP ]P (PP ).
(21)
where all components involving ci(·) are evaluated at x = x˜(d).
Adding variable costs changes this expression in two ways. First, the always-active choosers (AA) are
affected by a change in the default. The sign of the welfare effect on an always-active chooser is positive if
and only if x∗i < d. For an individual with x∗i < d, we will have that x∗i < xi(d) < d, and an increase in the
default makes it costlier to choose an option close to x∗i . The ρic′i term of the welfare effect for members of the
AA group in Equation 20 corresponds to the direct welfare effect of increasing this cost. Such an individual
also increases xi in response to this change in costs: it is straightforward to show that x˜′i(d) =
c′′i
c′′i −u′′i ∈ [0, 1).
The second term of the welfare effect for the AA group corresponds to the welfare impact of this change in
behavior.29 As before, when as-if costs are fully normatively relevant for all individuals, ρi = 1, and the
envelope theorem eliminates the indirect welfare effect from the behavioral response. However, when ρi < 1,
the individual over-reacts to the increase in costs, reducing their welfare. The opposite intuition applies
when x∗i > d; such individuals in the AA group are made better off by an increase in the default. The second
addition to the welfare calculation is the extra variable cost incurred by marginally active decision-makers
in the PA and AP groups. As it changes welfare discretely when the individual switches between choosing
actively and choosing passively, this component affects welfare in exactly the same fashion as the fixed cost.
Our key result that forcing active choice is optimal when default effects are driven purely by behavioral
frictions will still be true in this model, but properly examining an active choice policy requires subtle
reasoning here. In this model, setting an extreme default so that everyone opts out will not necessarily be
equivalent to forcing active choices directly. One might naturally suppose that when forcing active choices,
the planner sets no anchor, which eliminates the variable costs, whereas when a penalty default acts as
an anchor, the variable costs will matter for behavior and welfare. Suppose there is a policy that forces
decision-makers to make active choices and eliminates variable costs (i.e. it does not set an anchor). It
29Note that the behavioral response is x˜′(d) = 0 when costs are linear, i.e. c′′ = 0.
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is straightforward to show that such a policy will be globally optimal when pii is sufficiently small for all
individuals (regardless of ρi), exactly as in Proposition 3. However, whether such a policy becomes extremely
undesirable when pii and ρi are sufficiently high is not clear in this model, because the policy that forces
active choices also eliminates the variable costs and this can improve welfare. Conversely, a penalty default
will surely minimize welfare when pii and ρi are sufficiently high, but due to the large distortions on active
choices it may have through the variable costs, it may not be optimal when pii and ρi are large.
By a very similar procedure to the one we use in Proposition 4, one can show that minimizing opt-outs
is optimal when pii and ρi are sufficiently large, under some regularity conditions. Specifically, we could
maintain Assumptions (A4.1)-(A4.3), and add the assumption that the variable cost function is the same
for all individuals, ci(xi− d) = c(xi− d). Under these assumptions minimizing opt-outs will still be globally
optimal when default effects are driven by real components of individual welfare.
D Additional Details from Empirical Application
This Appendix provides additional results for our empirical application. First, we show in Figure 5 how the
marginal internalities from Figure 4 map to the mean optimal savings rate, E[x∗i ]. At µ = 0, the mean savings
rate corresponds to the observed savings rate when we simulate the model under the active choice policy,
which is a 7 percent contribution not including the employer matching contributions, or just over 9 percent
when we add in the match. As µ reaches larger values, the optimal savings rate increases and approaches the
maximum 15% contribution asymptotically. Interestingly, as µ increases, the optimal default in Figure 4a
approaches the maximum contribution more quickly than the mean optimal savings rate does. This finding
might seem counter-intuitive at first, but it occurs because there is a mass of individuals contributing 15%,
and the mass grows as µ increases. Like the 6% default before, this mass point is an attractive default
because it gives a large number of people their exactly ideal option and it leads few people to opt out (see
BFP Theorem 2).
Next, we show some results from two other employers, labeled “Company 1” and “Company 2” in BFP,
along with additional details on the parameters used to calculate welfare in the model. In the model used
here, the difference in distributions of contributions at different companies is used to identify differences in
µρ, which governs overall preferences over savings rates. Different companies also have different matching
contribution rates. All other parameters are the same across companies. A complete table of parameter
values is contained in Table 1.
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Figure 5: Marginal Internalities and Mean Optimal Contribution Rates
Table 1: Model Parameters and Plan Characteristics
Parameter Value
Mean savings utility weight, µρ, company 1 0.2150
Mean savings utility weight, µρ, company 2 0.1313
Mean savings utility weight, µρ, company 3 0.1570
Standard deviation of savings utility weight, σ 0.0910
Savings shift parameter, α 0.1340
Fraction with zero as-if costs, λ1 0.4011
As-if costs distribution parameter, λ2 11.81
Maximum matched contribution (all companies) 0.06
Employer match rate, company 1 1.0
Employer match rate, company 2 0.5
Employer match rate, company 3 0.5
Note: this table reports the parameter values we use in our empirical illustration. The parameter values
come from Table 2 of Bernheim, Fradkin and Popov (2015), for the “basic model.”
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Figure 6 repeats Figures 2 and 4 in the body of the text for Company 1. Figure 7 does the same for
Company 2. We can see that apart from relatively minor differences, we obtain the same results for all three
companies. The most noticeable difference is actually that the higher, 100 percent match rate at company
1 makes defaults lower than 6 percent much less desirable, which is intuitive.
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Figure 6: Results for Company 1
(a) Equivalent variation over defaults, by pi
(b) Active Choices versus Minimizing Opt-Outs
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Figure 7: Results for Company 2
(a) Equivalent variation over defaults, by pi
(b) Active Choices versus Minimizing Opt-Outs
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